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Delay of gratification is a complex decision-making behavior that is influenced by many 
contextual variables, such as cultural values, prior experience, and social trust. Research 
has shown that children’s delay behaviors are sensitive to these variables, which can 
explain seemingly irrational behavior. It also suggests that immediate consumption does 
not always indicate poor impulse control. However, previous studies have examined only 
group differences, which neglect important individual differences in the ability to modify 
delay behavior. In two studies, we examined children’s ability to adapt their delay and 
saving behavior according to the context and recent experience. It was predicted that 
children’s ability to switch their behavior would be related to greater executive function. 
In Study 1 (N = 140), 3.5- and 4.5-year-old children were categorized as delayers or non-
delayers based on a baseline delay choice task. In a second administration of the task, a 
risk of losing treats was associated with children’s preferred choice (i.e., delaying or not 
delaying), encouraging children to switch their behavior. Children were again categorized 
as delayers or non-delayers. In Study 2 (N  = 142), 3.5- and 4.5-year-old children were 
categorized as savers or spenders based on a baseline saving task where children could 
save marbles from a small marbles game for a later big marbles game. Children were then 
unable to play with the big game either because they had no marbles or because the big 
game was unexpectedly broken. In a second administration, children were again 
categorized as savers or spenders. In both studies, children who changed categorization 
across the two administrations, indicating a switch in behavior (e.g., delayer to non-
delayer, spender to saver) scored higher on a measure of set-shifting. The results 
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demonstrate that children can use the context and past experience to successfully adapt 
their delay and saving behaviors, and that executive function skills may be important in 
facilitating flexibility in these behaviors.
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Introduction 
The ability to resist the temptation of immediate distractions and forgo immediate 
pleasure in pursuit of long-term goals has relevance for many domains of functioning 
from health (e.g., addiction, nutrition, exercise), finances (e.g., spending, saving, 
investing), relationships (e.g., marriage, parenting), to education and career (e.g., 
studying, working). Delay of gratification and the self-control processes that underlie it 
has roots in early childhood. In their classic laboratory paradigm, Mischel and colleagues 
measured how long preschool-aged children were able to wait when given the choice 
between having one marshmallow now and waiting for two marshmallows later (e.g., 
Mischel, 1974; Mischel et al., 2011; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Younger 
children had difficulty waiting for delayed rewards, and often preferred strategies that 
made it more difficult to wait (Mischel & Mischel, 1983). Children’s ability to delay 
improved with age (e.g., Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Mischel & Patternson, 1976) as they 
began using more effective strategies such as self- distraction (e.g., Mischel, 1974; 
Mischel, Ebbesen, & Raskoff Zeiss, 1972) and reappraisal or reframing the reward or 
situation (e.g., Mischel & Baker, 1975).  
 Mischel and colleagues discovered that individual differences in wait times and 
delay behavior during early childhood predicted a range of developmental outcomes into 
adolescence and adulthood, including SAT scores and academic competence, self-
regulation, effective coping with stress and frustration, and positive peer relations (Ayduk 
et al., 2000; Ayduk et al., 2008; Eigsti et al., 2006; Mischel, Shoda & Peake 1988; Shoda, 
Mischel, Peake, 1990). Remarkably, Casey et al. (2011) found that children’s ability to 
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resist temptation at 4 years of age predicted their impulse control to positive emotional 
stimuli 40 years later, suggesting that there are long-term stable individual differences in 
delay of gratification.  
 Other researchers have reported similar outcomes associated with delay of 
gratification using various delay tasks, such as greater peer competence and peer relations 
(e.g., Olson, 1989; Olson & Hoza, 1993; Raver, Blackburn, Bancroft, & Torp, 1999), 
decreased antisocial and externalizing behaviors (e.g., Krueger, Caspi, Moffitt, & White, 
1996; Trentacosta & Shaw, 2009), higher IQ (e.g., Funder & Block, 1989), and greater 
academic achievement and work habits (e.g., Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Rimm-
Kaufman, Curby, Grimm, Nathanson, & Brock, 2009). 
Delay of gratification has clear significant social and economic benefits for both 
individuals and society; yet it appears to be a consistent struggle for not only children but 
many adults. Instead of saving and investing our money for the future, we spend it on 
frivolous purchases. In the new year, we resolve to eat well and exercise, but give up by 
the third week. If rational behavior and action should maximize utility (e.g., Herrnstein, 
1990), how do we explain failures to delay gratification?  
The underlying assumption is that the rational choice is always to delay or wait 
for the larger reward, and therefore, failures are interpreted as either irrational behavior or 
the consequence of deficient self-control and willpower. However, this is a misguided 
assumption. Whether a smaller immediate reward or a later larger reward is more 
adaptive is determined by the intersection of proximal and distal factors that 
contextualizes the problem in important ways. For example, in a situation where we do 
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not trust we will receive the later reward, or we have greater immediate needs, the wise 
choice would be to take the immediate reward. Failure to delay does not always indicate 
poor self-control, but may reflect a rational response within a given context (e.g., 
Fawcett, McNamara, & Houston, 2012; McGuire & Kable, 2012, 2013). Moreover, while 
being undercontrolled is often viewed negatively, being overcontrolled in these types of 
situations can also be maladaptive (Funder & Block, 1989).  
Contextual Influences on Delay Behavior  
There has been recent renewed interest in understanding the rationality behind 
delay behavior, or lack of delay behavior. In particular, there has been a focus on factors 
such as personal and cultural values (Carlson & Zelazo, 2011), social mistrust (Kidd, 
Palmeri, & Aslin, 2012; Michaelson, de la Vega, Chatham, & Munakata, 2013), and prior 
experience of reinforcement (McGuire & Kable, 2012, 2013), which may explain 
seemingly irrational impulsive behavior. However, the complexity of delay behavior has 
long been acknowledged and confirmed by early experimental findings. Delay of 
gratification can be influenced by many person and situation variables, which themselves 
can interact to determine behavior (e.g., Herzberger & Dweck, 1978; Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999; Mischel, 1966; 1974; Mischel & Shoda, 1995).  
For example, the dimensions that define the task itself directly affect motivation 
to delay. According to the expectancy-value model, the likelihood of delaying depends on 
the combination of the subjective value of the rewards presented and the expected 
probability of receiving the later rewards (e.g., Mischel, 1966). With greater delays, the 
expectancy associated with later rewards decreases, as does the subjective value of later 
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rewards, which are “discounted” (Mischel & Masters, 1966; Mischel & Metzner 1962). 
By varying the delay time and reward magnitude, one can calculate the rate at which a 
future reward is discounted, called the temporal discount function. Steeper discount 
functions indicate that an individual prefers an immediate reward over a later reward at 
lower values of the immediate reward and at shorter delay periods. There are both 
individual and age differences in discount functions across childhood, adolescence, and 
early adulthood (e.g., Scheres et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 2009). Even young children 
have been shown to be sensitive to delay intervals and its effects on perceived 
attractiveness of rewards (e.g., Mischel, Grusec, & Master, 1969; Mischel & Metzner, 
1962; Schwarz, Schrager, & Lyons, 1983). Children also respond differently to the types 
of rewards used (e.g., Bonato & Boland; 1983; Johnson, Parry, & Drabman, 1978; Koriat 
& Nisan, 1978), and to different reward magnitudes (e.g., Herzberger & Dweck, 1978; 
Koriat & Nisan, 1978; Lemmon & Moore, 2007).   
More distal factors such as sociocultural norms and values may exert a less 
obvious influence on delay of gratification choices (e.g., Carlson & Zelazo, 2011). 
However, beliefs about the importance of saving or not saving, the value of self-control, 
or general trustworthiness of people, can have important implications. Mischel (1958) 
described research in Trinidad, showing that the delay behavior of children from different 
sub-cultural groups was consistent with sub-cultural attitudes towards delay. Gallimore, 
Weiss, and Finney (1974) also reviewed findings on Hawaiian-American children, whose 
seemingly poor delay behavior could be interpreted as adaptive when understood within 
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the cultural importance of immediate consumption during social gatherings for building 
relationships, affiliation, and social credit.  
Goals or values about delaying can also be primed experimentally. In a study by 
Kesek, Cunningham, Packer, and Zelazo (2011), children listened to a story that 
emphasized either maximizing rewards or receiving rewards immediately, and 
subsequently children in the maximizing rewards condition delayed significantly more 
than children in the immediate rewards condition. Use of more explicit modeling and 
verbal persuasion and reasoning can similarly influence delay behavior and attitudes 
(e.g., Bandura & Mischel, 1965; Nisan & Koriat, 1984; Staub, 1972). For example, 
Bandura and Mischel (1965) exposed delayers and non-delayers to live adult models who 
exhibited the opposite behavior, and subsequent retesting showed changes in delay 
behavior in the direction that was modeled. 
Several recent studies have focused on expectations for receiving rewards. In 
Kidd et al. (2012), children completed an art activity during which some promised 
desirable art supplies were either delivered or not delivered by the experimenter. Children 
who experienced unreliability with the experimenter waited significantly less time during 
a subsequent delay of gratification task than children who experienced reliability. This 
study replicated earlier findings from Mahrer (1956), when an experimenter promised 
children a balloon the following day on 4 consecutive days, and either consistently, 
inconsistently or never delivered the balloons. When children were then given a choice 
between an immediate or delayed reward by the same experimenter, those who received 
the balloons consistently delayed more often than those who did not. When a different 
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experimenter offered the choice, there was no difference in the delay choices between the 
groups. 
 Mistrust can also arise independent of direct recent experience with agents in a 
delay context. Strickland (1972) found that African-American children were less likely to 
delay with a White experimenter than an African-American experimenter, possibly from 
general mistrust of White individuals. More recently, Michaelson et al. (2013) reported a 
similar effect in adults, who were less likely to delay when delay choices were simply 
paired with faces and character vignettes that were rated low in trustworthiness.  
Expectancy about rewards can be inferred not only from beliefs about the 
reliability or trustworthiness of the agent delivering the rewards, but also from non-social 
cues, such as statistical information in the environment which give cues to the 
probabilistic distribution of delay durations (McGuire & Kable, 2012, 2013). In a 
situation where the probability of delay duration is characterized by a Gaussian or normal 
distribution (see McGuire & Kable, 2013), the longer you wait, the closer you expect to 
be to the reward. For example, after sitting for a long period watching a play, you expect 
that the end should be close. In other situations characterized by heavy-tailed 
distributions, where rewards either come very quickly or are indefinitely long, the longer 
you wait, the longer you expect to wait. For example, when on hold for a call with no 
answer in the first 5 minutes, you expect that the wait could be very long. When there is 
uncertainty about when a future reward will arrive, as is the case in Mischel’s classic 
paradigm, continued persistence in waiting may not always be appropriate (e.g., 
Dasgupta & Maskin, 2005; Fawcett et al., 2012; Rachlin, 2000). In theses situations, we 
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should be guided by our temporal beliefs about the environment. In an experimental 
demonstration by McGuire and Kable (2012), adults completed a computer task 
consisting of trials offering choices between taking an immediate small reward and 
waiting for an unknown amount of time for a larger reward. Those exposed to conditions 
with delays following a heavy-tailed distribution showed less persistence over time than 
those exposed to delays following a Gaussian distribution, suggesting that people 
calibrate their persistence in an adaptive manner to the environment and past experience.  
Taken together, these research studies provide collective evidence that delay of 
gratification and its associated paradigms are sensitive to contextual factors and are likely 
measuring more than self-control. The end goal is not always to delay. Sometimes not 
delaying is the most adaptive choice and is guided by rational considerations. 
Nonetheless, many of the above studies have relied primarily on showing group 
differences rather than individual change. Specifically, they do not address individual 
differences in the ability to respond adaptively to different contexts. 
Without information about both children’s baseline behavior and later posttest 
behavior, we cannot clearly identify which individuals did or did not modify their 
behavior in the new context (e.g., social mistrust), nor differentiate between those who 
were induced to shift their behavior (e.g., delayers choosing to not delay) and those who 
had no need to shift their behavior (e.g., non-delayers). Furthermore, if we know 
children’s baseline responses, we can tailor manipulations to the individual, and assess 
change in delay behavior in both directions. That is, when given convincing reasons to do 
so, can delayers take immediate rewards and can non-delayers wait for later rewards? 
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With the exception of a few (e.g., Bandura & Mischel, 1965; Nisan & Koriat, 1984), 
previous studies have mostly ignored baseline preferences.  
The Role of Executive Function  
When a situation calls for behavior that conflicts with one’s desires, tendencies, or 
predispositions, whether delaying when one typically prefers immediate gratification, or 
acting on impulse when one typically would refrain, self-control processes may play an 
important role. Self-control draws on executive functions (EF), neurocognitive processes 
involved in the conscious control of emotions, thoughts, and behaviors, including 
working memory, inhibitory control and set-shifting (Carlson, Zelazo, & Faja, 2013; 
Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). 
Emerging in the first year of life, EF undergoes significant development over the 
preschool years (Zelazo & Müller, 2002) as reflected by age-related improvements on a 
wide range of EF tasks administered to young children (Carlson, 2005). Neurological 
evidence regarding the prefrontal cortex, which is associated with EF, suggests a 
protracted development throughout childhood and into adolescence (e.g., Casey, Giedd, 
& Thomas, 2000; Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 
1997) that parallels developmental changes at the behavioral and cognitive level.    
In particular, set-shifting (i.e., switching between different mental sets, functions, 
or rules) may be associated with one’s ability to adjust behavior across situations. In 
preschoolers, a commonly used measure of EF is the Dimensional Change Card Sort 
(DCCS; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Zelazo, 2006), a task that involves sorting bivalent 
cards (e.g., red rabbit, blue boat) with target cards (e.g., blue rabbit, red boat), by one set 
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of rules (e.g., color), and then switching and sorting by an incompatible set of rules (e.g., 
shape). Younger children often perseverate and continue sorting by the first set of rules, 
despite knowing the new rules. Flexibly switching to the second set of rules improves 
with age and may involve an increased ability to reflect on and hierarchically integrate 
higher order rules (e.g., if it is the color game, follow these rules; but if it is the shape 
game, follow these rules; Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; Zelazo & Frye, 1988). As EF matures, 
it can also facilitate greater attention to relevant contextual information, leading to 
reappraisal of stimuli and events, and reevaluating different response options 
(Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007), which are important 
processes in adaptive behavior. The same processes that are involved in reappraisal and 
switching between using incompatible rules might also enable children to flexibly switch 
behaviors across environmental contexts (e.g., if context A, then delay; if context B, then 
do not delay). 
The Role of Emotion and Motivation: Hot Tasks  
Although our primary focus is on delay of gratification, there are other behaviors 
that are characterized by the same context-dependency as delay of gratification, whereby 
the adaptiveness of a behavioral response is determined by the context or environment. 
For example, taking big risks in gambling is generally maladaptive, but it may be a wise 
strategy if substantial needs must be met in very little time. Similarly, although 
persistence is generally admired, persistence in an activity that no longer yields any 
reward or pleasure can be seen as stubborn or perseverative. As with delay of 
gratification, the same difficulties in interpretation arise when individuals exhibit risky 
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behaviors or lack of persistence. They may be showing poor decision-making and poor 
control, or alternatively, they may be demonstrating rational adaptive responses. 
Tasks that involve affective and motivationally salient features, especially in the 
form of rewards and punishments, have been called “hot” tasks in the EF literature. They 
are distinguished from “cool” tasks characterized by decontextualized problems that are 
well-defined, abstract, and symbolic in nature, such as the DCCS. Cool tasks often have 
clear correct and incorrect answers that do not change with situational factors, and largely 
involve maximizing control. Some tasks considered cool include the DCCS, tapping a 
wooden peg once when the experimenter taps twice and vice versa, a measure of 
inhibitory control (Diamond & Taylor, 1996), and remembering and repeating a series of 
words or numbers in reverse order, a of measure working memory (Davis & Pratt, 1996). 
In contrast, hot tasks are often under the influence of multiple factors that affect how one 
should respond. Some tasks considered hot include delay of gratification, resisting 
temptation to peak at a gift (e.g., Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 
1996; Murray & Kochanska, 2002), choosing between risky options with both gains and 
losses in gambling tasks (e.g., Carlson, Zayas, & Guthormsen, 2009; Crone & van der 
Molen, 2004; Kerr & Zelazo, 2004), responding to stimuli with changing reinforcement 
contingencies in object reversal tasks (e.g., Overman, Bachevalier, Schumann, & Ryan, 
1996), and discontinuing a no-longer rewarded response in extinction tasks (e.g., 
Gladstone, 1969; Happaney & Zelazo, 2004).  
In these hot tasks, rewarding or punishing stimuli and situations are often critical 
components of the task, and the motivation, emotion, and meaning elicited by these 
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stimuli directly impact performance. There is likely individual variation in how children 
interpret and respond to these stimuli and events, which makes the task potentially non-
uniform across children. These tasks are also characterized by choices and response 
options that are often not clearly defined as correct or incorrect. For example, in an 
extinction task, children may be told to continue responding to a stimulus and stop 
whenever they wish, but there is no clear expectation of when to do so (Happaney & 
Zelazo, 2004). In the Less is More task (Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005), children are 
shown a series of small and large piles of treats, and the pile they point to is given to a 
puppet and children receive the other pile; however, the experimenter does not suggest a 
right or wrong answer. This is in contrast to cool tasks that have clear goals, answers, and 
expectations. It is this openness in hot tasks that allows children to bring in other 
influences to bear, such as cultural beliefs and values. In an extinction task, children may 
continue to respond to a no-longer rewarded stimulus because they perceive it as 
important to the experimenter and value compliance. In the Less is More task, children 
may be socialized to value sharing and giving to others, and thus point to the larger pile 
in order to share more treats with the puppet, rather than receive more treats for 
themselves.  
Perhaps a reflection of their sensitivity to context, hot tasks are more 
heterogeneous than cool tasks, and different paradigms do not consistently correlate or 
load on the same factor (e.g., Dalen, Sonuga-Barke, Hall, & Remington, 2004; Garon & 
Moore, 2007; Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005; Olson, Schilling, & 
Bates, 1999; Prencipe et al., 2011; Sonuga-Barke, Dalen, & Remington, 2003). Despite 
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this lack of coherence, hot tasks seem to differ from cool tasks in a number of ways. Hot 
and cool tasks often do not correlate and load on different factors (e.g., Brock, Rimm-
Kaufman, Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & 
Breton, 2002; Murray & Kochanska, 2002; Olson, 1989; Olson et al., 1999; Smith-
Donald, Raver, Hayes, & Richardson, 2007). Unlike cool tasks, hot tasks are often 
unrelated to IQ (e.g., Dalen et al., 2004; Hongwaniskul, et al., 2005; Sonuga-Barke et al., 
2003; Toplak, Jain, & Tannock, 2005), and inconsistently related to age (e.g., Beck, 
Schaefer, Pang, & Carlson, 2011; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Schwarz et al., 1983; 
Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997).  
They also differentially predict developmental outcomes. Whereas cool tasks 
strongly predict academic outcomes (e.g., Blair & Razza, 2007; Brock et al., 2009; Raver 
et al., 2011; Willoughby, Kupersmidt, Voegler-Lee, & Bryant, 2011), there are mixed 
findings regarding the relation between delay of gratification and early academic skills 
(e.g., Duckworth & Seligman, 2006; Smith-Donald et al., 2007; Thorell, 2007). Delay of 
gratification often predicts peer functioning and competence, while sometimes, cool tasks 
in the same studies can show little or no relations (e.g., Olson, 1989; Olson & Hoza, 
1993).  
These differences between hot and cool tasks, as well as the heterogeneous nature 
of hot tasks, may partially be related to the complexity of hot tasks and their ability to be 
influenced by the context. It is important to note, however, that purely hot or cool tasks 
do not exist and differences are likely a matter degree, with some tasks primarily 
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emphasizing cool aspects and some emphasizing hot aspects. Cool tasks can also be 
influenced by contextual factors, but to a lesser degree.  
The Role of Temperament 
 Above we discussed contextual factors that may influence children’s general 
preferences for delay, such as broad mistrust of others or cultural beliefs in the value of 
saving. Other factors may influence children’s situational preferences for delay, such as 
the type of reward or experience with the agent. However, given the emotional and 
motivational aspects of delay behavior, as well as those measured in other hot tasks, 
another important determinant of children’s behavior and preferences is their 
temperament. Without invoking rules of rationality and reason, children are predisposed 
behaviorally and physiologically to certain styles of responding, characterized by 
different levels of approach behavior toward rewards and different levels of fear and 
withdrawal. For example, a child who is impulsive with high approach tendencies will 
find it difficult to resist an appetitive immediate reward, but a child who is inhibited with 
low approach will find it less difficult. The children can be behaviorally indistinguishable 
in demonstrating delay behavior, but in the former case, exertion of self-control is 
required, whereas in the latter case, self-control is less relevant in the absence of a strong 
urge to be inhibited. Thus, children’s temperamental style can physiologically bias their 
delay behavior, making it more or less difficult or desirable.  
Temperament is understood broadly as the individual differences in emotional, 
motor, and attentional reactivity, as well as the individual differences in effortful control, 
which modulates that reactivity (Rothbart, 2007). These systems develop early in life, 
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with regulation initially more reactive, and becoming more voluntary as effortful control 
develops with age. Individual differences have both physiological and neurological 
underpinnings, emerges early in infancy, and remains moderately stable across later 
childhood and adolescence (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997).  
The reactive motivational system, rooted in limbic circuits, is comprised of an 
appetitive-approach system, and a fear-avoidance system. The appetitive-approach 
system promotes approach behavior towards rewarding and positive stimuli and events, 
and is governed through circuits that include the basolateral amygdala, the ventral 
tegmental area, and the nucleus accumbens (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997). The fear-
avoidance system promotes inhibited motor activity, increased arousal, and heightened 
attention, and is governed through hippocampal and amygdala circuits that respond to 
novel signals, biologically prepared fear signals, and punishment (Derryberry & 
Rothbart, 1997). It also functions to inhibit and regulate the appetitive-approach system, 
although in a reflexive rather than voluntary manner. These reactive systems are in turn 
regulated by the anterior attentional system, which is involved in the control and 
flexibility of attention to spatial and semantic information, and has circuitry centered on 
the anterior cingulate region (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997). Known as effortful control, 
the system is defined as the voluntary and flexible control of behavior through attentional 
and inhibitory mechanisms that serve to inhibit a dominant response and activate a 
subdominant response (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000; Rothbart & Bates, 1998). 
Although a dimension of temperament, it is considered closely related to EF and may 
capture stable individual differences in EF (e.g., Duckworth & Carlson, 2013; Zhou, 
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Chen, & Main, 2012). In fact, many preschool effortful control tasks (e.g., Kochanska, 
Murray, & Coy, 1997; Kochanska et al., 1996) resemble those used to measure EF (e.g., 
Carlson, 2005), and relations between performance on EF tasks and parent ratings of 
effortful control have been reported (e.g., Chang & Burns, 2005; Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, 
& Posner, 2003).  
Effortful control modulates both the approach and fear systems as dictated by 
environmental demands. Having very high approach or very high fear/withdrawal can be 
problematic, especially when it cannot be adequately modulated according to the context. 
Several investigators such as Fox (1994) and Nigg (2000) suggest that undercontrol can 
lead to externalizing problems (e.g., attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder, 
oppositional behavior) and overcontrol can lead to internalizing problems (e.g., 
depression and anxiety). This is consistent with Kagan’s work with behaviorally inhibited 
children who display fear and withdrawal in new unfamiliar situations, leading to 
restriction of exploration, avoidance of novelty, and high reactivity and distress (Kagan, 
Reznick, & Gibbons, 1989). Block and Block (1980) describe how overcontrol and 
inhibition, as well as undercontrol and impulsivity can be maladaptive; however, high 
ego-resilience can allow individuals to modulate their level of ego-control to flexibly 
adjust their behavior to varying situational demands. 
Consistent with the idea that the extremes of the spectrum at either end can be 
maladaptive, in one study (Murray & Kochanska, 2002), preschoolers who scored high 
on effortful control tasks had greater internalizing symptoms, whereas those who scored 
low on effortful control had greater externalizing symptom. Those in the middle showed 
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the most adaptive functioning. Similarly, in 4- to 6-year-olds, emotional regulation was 
best for children who exhibited intermediate performance on a battery of mostly hot 
inhibitory tasks (Carlson & Wang, 2007). Although it may appear that children with very 
high or low effortful control are at greater risk for problems, both reactive control and 
effortful control are confounded in these tasks. It is more likely that high approach and 
high fear/withdrawal may be driving these findings, although poor effortful control may 
also contribute to problematic behaviors.   
Temperamental differences related to approach and fear/withdrawal may 
influence delay behavior, and accordingly, effortful control may play an important role in 
children’s ability to adjust their delay behavior. In particular, when the reactive systems 
of approach and fear/withdrawal are engaged and activated, effortful control may be 
necessary to regulate behavior towards adaptive responses that run counter to those 
promoted by these reactive systems. 
The Current Studies 
We designed a novel dependent variable to evaluate flexibility in delay of 
gratification behavior. Beyond simply measuring delay behavior, we were interested in 
whether preschool-aged children would flexibly adjust their delay behavior when placed 
in a context where the most adaptive response is the behavior opposite to their baseline 
preferences. Using a within-subjects design, we first assessed children’s baseline 
behavior and then assessed children’s behavior a second time under new conditions that 
should encourage them to change their behavior according to what is adaptive or rational. 
We expected variability in children’s responses with regard to switching, that those who 
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adaptively altered their behavior would show greater EF on an independent measure. 
Furthermore, we investigated whether results could be replicated across different but 
related behaviors, specifically delay discounting and saving, which are both considered to 
be hot. This would provide stronger support that findings related to flexibility are not 
specific to a particular paradigm, and can be applied to a family of decision-making 
behaviors.  
In Study 1, children were offered a series of choices between less treats 
immediately and more treats later, thus measuring their delay decisions (e.g., Mischel, 
1966; Schwarz et al., 1983; Thompson et al., 1997). This is representative of a typical 
delay choice paradigm used in the literature and also displays characteristics that suggest, 
as with other delay tasks, it may be sensitive to situational factors and individual 
differences. Performance is not strongly or consistently related to IQ and other EF 
measures (e.g., Beck et al., 2011; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Schwarz et al., 1983). 
Reports regarding age-related differences have also been mixed, with age differences 
found in older children (e.g., Melikian, 1959; Mischel, 1958; Mischel & Metzner, 1962; 
Shipe & Lazare, 1969), but often not observed during the preschool period (e.g., Beck et 
al., 2011; Lindstrom & Shipman, 1972; Montgomery, 1976; Schwarz et al., 1983; Toner, 
Holstein, & Hetherington, 1977). However, there have been a few exceptions from recent 
studies (e.g., Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 1997).  
In Study 2, children were offered a chance to play with a small marbles race game 
followed by a big marbles race game, but were only given 3 marbles at the beginning, 
requiring them to save marbles from the smaller game to play with the bigger game, thus 
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assessing their decision to save for the future. This saving paradigm was developed by 
Metcalf and Atance (2011), who interestingly reported no age differences between 3-, 4-, 
and 5-year-olds, which suggests that, like delay choice, individual differences may be a 
significant determinant of baseline saving behavior. Furthermore, in their study, children 
were administered the paradigm twice, and a subset of children who initially did not save 
any marbles, saved one or more marbles the second time. This indicates that children’s 
saving behavior can be influenced by experience, which makes it particularly suitable for 
our manipulations and interest in observing changes in saving behavior. 
Wärneryd (1999) describes saving as the postponing of some consumption for 
future enjoyment. In discussions of delay of gratification behavior and self-control, 
saving is often not clearly distinguished from delaying, and sometimes the ability to delay 
gratification is seen as a precursor to saving (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Wärneryd, 1999). Delay 
of gratification and saving are similar in that they both require inhibiting impulses 
towards immediate rewards and both unfold across time. Nonetheless, some argue that 
while closely related, saving and delay of gratification retain some important differences, 
at least as measured by standard tasks (Sonuga-Barke & Webley, 1993). Delay of 
gratification tests children’s waiting ability, particularly in Mischel’s paradigm, and 
waiting is the cost to attain a larger reward. The time is wasted and is not necessarily 
productive towards the end goal. Waiting is not equal to saving. While there is an 
inherent passage of time during saving, it is not a cost, but a necessity to provide 
opportunities to accumulate rewards across time. Unlike delay of gratification, saving 
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involves the integration of multiple events during which immediate consumption must be 
given up repeatedly in service of a future goal.  
The delay choice paradigm also involves multiple opportunities to delay, as in 
saving. Metcalf and Atance (2011), however, argue that there are still important 
differences. In the delay choice task, children do not give up the immediate reward, but 
simply need to wait to gain the reward plus more.  In contrast, during the marbles saving 
task, children who save give up an opportunity for current enjoyment that is not 
recoverable. Saving may also involve more future-oriented thinking and considerations 
(Metcalf & Atance, 2011). Children need to consider future needs, prepare for 
unexpected future circumstances, and understand that present spending behaviors have 
future consequences (Otto, Schots, Westerman, & Webley, 2006).  
We expected that individual differences in delay and saving flexibility would be 
related to various factors. First, we predicted that switching would be related to age, with 
older children showing more flexibility than younger children due to increasing EF skills 
that are associated with age (Carlson et al., 2013). Second, we predicted asymmetry in the 
direction of switching. The less taxing response is to be impulsive and take immediate 
rewards, and thus it may be more difficult for non-delayers and spenders to wait and save 
than for delayers and savers to choose immediate rewards or spend their resources. Third, 
we predicted that the ability to switch would be related to performance on a set-shifting 
task, if the same EF processes that underlie DCCS performance also underlie switching. 
In contrast, baseline delaying and saving was expected to be unrelated to, or not strongly 
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related to age, consistent with previous findings, and also unrelated to set-shifting (e.g., 
Hongwanishkul et al., 2005). 
We were also interested in exploring how individual differences in temperament 
may affect children’s delay and saving behavior, given the relevance of the reactive 
motivation system in these reward paradigms. A widely-used parent-report questionnaire 
of children’s temperament, the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (e.g., Putnam & 
Rothbart, 2006; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 2001) was included, from which 
three factors could be derived that represent the appetitive-approach (Surgency), fear-
avoidance (Negative Affect), and effortful control (Effortful Control) systems 
respectively. Given the affective nature of the tasks, we predicted that greater approach 
tendencies would be related to less delay and saving behavior. If the fear-avoidance 
system inhibits the approach system, higher fear and avoidance tendencies would be 
related to greater delay and saving. Given the role of effortful control in regulating these 
temperamental systems, and its similarity and overlap with EF, it was predicted that 
effortful control, like set-shifting, would be associated with children’s ability to adjust 
their delay and saving behavior. This may be particularly relevant when behavior must be 
shifted in a direction that is contrary to children’s temperamental predisposition (e.g., 
non-delayer with high approach switching to delaying).  
Study 1 
Children’s ability to be flexible with their delay behavior was examined using the 
delay choice paradigm with food treats. Children’s baseline preference for delaying was 
assessed and children were then administered the delay choice task a second time with 
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modifications to the delivery of treats such that their preference at baseline (i.e., to delay 
or not delay) was associated with a risk of losing treats. This should create incentive for 
children to shift their choices away from baseline choices that have become risky, and 
towards less preferred choices that are not risky. 
Method 
Participants. Children were recruited from a large Midwestern city through a 
university database of families that had expressed interest in research. Screening criteria 
included full-term birth and absence of any serious medical conditions and 
developmental disorders. A total of 41 children were excluded because they showed no 
clear preference to delay or not delay (see below), a procedure also used by Bandura and 
Mischel (1965) when they tailored their intervention to delayers and non-delayers. 
Excluded were 13 3.5-year-olds (10 females) and 28 4.5-year-olds (18 females) 
respectively. Significantly more 4.5-year-olds, χ2(1, N = 181) = 7.75, p = .004, and more 
females, χ2(1, N = 181) = 6.88 p = .007), were excluded. Ten children failed to start or 
complete the tasks due to fatigue, lack of interest, or noncompliance, and were also 
excluded from analyses.  
The final sample consisted of 140 children, including 79 3.5-year-olds (M = 42.42 
months, SD = .68, 35 females), and 61 4.5-year-olds (M = 54.51 months, SD = .77, 28 
females). The majority of children were White and non-Hispanic (84.3%), with the 
remaining sample consisting of children of White and Hispanic, African-American, 
Asian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and mixed ethnicity. Families were 
predominantly two caregiver households (96.4%) and the majority of primary caregivers, 
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mostly mothers, reported attaining a bachelors degree or higher (84.3%). The median and 
mode household income was $75 000 to $99 999.   
Procedure and Measures. Families were invited to the lab for a one-hour visit 
where children were assessed individually in a quiet child-friendly laboratory room 
during a videotaped 40–45 minute session. Parents completed a general demographics 
questionnaire (e.g., family living situation and structure, parent education and income, 
child’s ethnicity). Children first completed the standard delay choice task (9 trials) to 
determine their baseline performance. They were categorized as delayers if they delayed 
6 to 9 trials, and non-delayers if they delayed 0 to 3 trials. Children who delayed 4 or 5 
trials, showing no clear preference, were excluded from analyses.  
After completing a standardized receptive vocabulary test, children were 
randomly assigned to either an experimental or a control-risk condition and administered 
a modified version of the delay choice task that introduced a risk of losing treats. In the 
experimental condition, children were encouraged to choose their non-preferred choice 
(i.e., delayers to not delay, non-delayers to delay) by associating risk with their preferred 
choice. A total of 77 children were assigned to the experimental condition, including 44 
3.5-year-olds (20 females) and 33 4.5-year-olds (17 females). In the control-risk 
condition, children were encouraged to choose their preferred choice (i.e., delayers to 
delay, non-delayers to not delay) by associating risk with their non-preferred choice. This 
control-risk condition assessed the extent of spontaneous switching when there was no 
adaptive reason to do so. In fact, switching could be considered maladaptive since the 
less preferred choice was associated with risk. Switching may be observed, nonetheless, 
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if children find risk or the stimuli of the risky option attractive. A total of 33 children 
were assigned to this control-risk condition, including 17 3.5-year-olds (7 females) and 
16 4.5-year-olds (6 females).  
An additional control-no-risk group was later added to confirm and replicate 
previous findings (Beck et al., 2011) of test-retest reliability of the delay choice task 
within a session. Children in this second control-no-risk condition were administered the 
delay choice task a second time, but with no risk involved. The 30 children in this group 
included 17 3.5-years-olds (5 females) and 13 4.5-year-olds (3 females). 
After the second delay choice task, children were again categorized as delayers (5 
to 9 trials) or non-delayers (0 to 4 trials). Children who delayed 4 or 5 trials were not 
excluded here since the number of trials delayed did not reflect children’s natural 
preference without intervention, but was influenced by our experimental manipulation. If 
children’s classification changed across the two tasks (e.g., delayer to non-delayer), they 
were considered to be switchers. If children’s classification did not change across the two 
tasks (e.g., remained a delayer), they were considered to be non-switchers. All children 
then completed an independent measure of set-shifting ability adapted from the DCCS.  
Delay Choice Baseline. This task was adapted from Thompson and colleagues 
(1997) and Prencipe and Zelazo (2005). Children were given a choice of several types of 
treats to use in the game to ensure that the treat was desirable (e.g., small crackers, sugary 
cereal, raisins). Then they were offered a series of choices between having one treat now, 
which was placed in a bowl and could be eaten immediately, and more treats later, which 
were placed in an opaque envelope to be retrieved at the end of the session. The side of 
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presentation for the treats was counterbalanced. There were 9 trials in total, balanced 
across three types of contingencies (i.e., 1 versus 2, 1 versus 4, 1 versus 6) presented in a 
fixed mixed order. The experimenter first demonstrated both choices for herself, 
choosing now and choosing later. For each test trial, children were presented with the 
treats and asked to make a choice (i.e., “Do you want to choose 1 now or 4 later?”).  
Delay Choice Modified. In the modified task, the same treats, number of trials, 
order, and contingencies were used. Two panels with clear plastic tubes were introduced 
as part of the game and placed side by side in front of the child (see Figure 1). Both 
panels had a single vertical tube where treats were deposited. Halfway down the panel, 
the single tube split into two separate tubes. Hidden from the children was a tab at the 
back that controlled which tube the treats went down. In one panel, two bowls were 
placed under the two lower tubes to catch the treats. In this case, there was a 100% 
chance of receiving the treats. In the other panel, a bowl was placed under only one tube 
and the other tube led to an opaque sealed box. In this case, there was a chance that the 
treats would get stuck in the box and not be delivered.  
Each choice (i.e., now or later) was associated with a different panel. In the 
experimental condition, the risky panel was associated with the later choice for delayers 
and with the now choice for non-delayers. In the control-risk condition, the risky panel 
was associated with the now choice for delayers and the later choice for non-delayers. 
Children in the control-no-risk condition had two non-risky panels. The experimenter 
demonstrated how both panels worked. For example, the experimenter showed delayers 
in the experimental condition how treats for “now” that fell into either bowl under the 
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non-risky panel could be eaten, and how treats for “later” that fell into the bowl under the 
risky panel would be placed in the envelope. However, treats for “later” that fell into the 
box under the risky panel were lost and could not be retrieved. The experimenter 
demonstrated both choices for herself, choosing now and choosing later. Rule checks 
were administered, assessing children’s knowledge of which choices were associated 
with which panels, as well as what happened to the treats with each bowl and box. 
Children were questioned up to two times with incorrect responses corrected. During test 
trials, the risky panel was fixed such that treats always fell into the box and were always 
lost. To mirror the behavior of the risky panel, the non-risky panel was also fixed such 
that the treats consistently fell into only one bowl on the right. At the end of the task, 
children were asked to identify which panel they liked the best. 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-4). In this standardized test of receptive 
vocabulary (Dunn & Dunn, 2007), children were shown a series of pages with pictures 
and asked to point to 1 of 4 pictures on each page, corresponding to a word spoken by the 
experimenter. Standard administration was used.  
Executive Function Scale (EF Scale™). This task developed by Carlson (2012) 
and was adapted and expanded from the DCCS (Zelazo, 2006) for a wider age range with 
multiple levels of complexity. Children were asked to sort cards into two opaque boxes 
affixed with target cards. There were seven levels of complexity with the start level 
dependent on the child’s age (e.g., 3.5-year-olds started at level 3, 4.5-year-olds started at 
level 4). Level 4 was comparable to the standard DCCS task, where children were asked 
to sort red stars and blue trucks into boxes with target cards of a blue star and a red truck, 
   26 
 
first by color (pre-switch), and then by shape (post-switch). Level 3 involved different 
sorting and target cards where the dimension of color and shape were separated (i.e., a 
black star on red background, a black truck on blue background). If children passed the 
initial level, passing both pre-switch and post-switch, more difficult levels were 
administered until children failed. If children failed the initial level, lower levels were 
administered in a backward fashion until children passed. In this manner, the highest 
level at which children could perform was determined. In the now standardized protocol, 
there are 5 trials in both pre-switch and post-switch, and in order to pass a level, children 
must correctly sort at least 4 out of 5 trials in both pre-switch and post-switch. In the 
current study, a slightly earlier version of the task was used, with 6 trials in both pre-
switch and post-switch, and sorting 5 out of 6 trials was considered passing a level. For 
further details on each level, please refer to Carlson and Schaefer (2012).  
Children’s Behavior Questionnaire Very Short Form (CBQ-VSF). Parents 
were asked to complete the Very Short Form of the CBQ (Putnam & Rothbart, 2006), a 
parent-report measure of children’s temperament. Parents were asked to rate 36 items, 
indicating how true each item was of their children in the last 6 months on a 7-point 
Likert scale. The items described different behaviors children may show in various 
situations (e.g., “Is afraid of the dark”). Three dimensions of temperament were derived 
from the questionnaire, including Surgency, Negative Affect, and Effortful Control. 
Surgency included items related to impulsivity, activity level, high intensity pleasure, and 
shyness (negatively loading). Negative Affect included items related to frustration, 
discomfort, fear, sadness, and soothability (negatively loading). Effortful control included 
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items related to low intensity pleasure, smiling and laughter, inhibitory control, 
attentional focusing, and perceptual sensitivity. 
Results     
Descriptive. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical analyses unless 
otherwise noted. All children completed all tasks, except 5 children in the control group 
were included who did not complete PPVT and EF Scale. No statistical differences were 
found between the experimental, control-risk, and control-no-risk groups with respect to 
age, sex, baseline delaying, PPVT, and EF Scale, and therefore the groups were analyzed 
together for baseline analyses. A total of 51 children (36.4%) were classified as delayers 
and 89 children (63.6%) as non-delayers. The proportion of non-delayers was 
significantly higher than expected by chance as indicated by a binomial test, p = .002. As 
shown in Table 1, children’s baseline status was marginally related to age, with 44.3% of 
4.5-year-olds categorized as delayers compared to 30.5 % of 3.5-year-olds, χ2(1, N = 
140) = 2.86, p = .065. More females, 49.2%, were categorized as delayers than males, 
26.0%, χ2(1, N = 140) = 8.08, p = .004. No relation was seen with PPVT, t(136) = -.044, 
p = .965. The sex difference remained significant after applying a Bonferroni corrected 
alpha rate of .0167 (0.05/3). 
Switching. In the control-risk group (n = 33), only 5 children switched (15.2%), 
and in the control-no-risk group (n = 30), only 3 children switched (10.0%). Since the 
rate of switching in both groups did not differ, χ2(1, N = 63) = .38 p = .410, nor did the 
groups differ on other variables described above, the two groups were collapsed into a 
single control group for further analyses (n = 63). In the experimental group (n = 77), 27 
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children switched (35.1%), which is significantly higher than the 8 children (12.7%) who 
spontaneously switched in the control group, χ2(1, N = 140) = 9.24 p = .002. To further 
confirm that switching was low in the absence of any intervention, the first half of 
baseline trials (1 to 4) was compared to the second half of baseline trials (6 to 9), with 
trial 5 omitted. No differences were found in the mean number of trials delayed between 
the first half (M = 1.49, SD = 1.56) and the second half (M = 1.53, SD = 1.59), t(139) = -
.43, p = .669, suggesting that within the span of the task, overall response patterns 
remained consistent with no spontaneous switching.  
Differences between switchers and non-switchers were evident by the first trial of 
the modified delay task. In the group of baseline delayers, switchers were less likely to 
delay on the first trial (M = .44, SD = .51) than non-switchers (M = 0.88, SD = .33), t(31) 
= 2.99, p = .006. In the group of non-delayers, switchers were more likely to delay on the 
first trial (M = .36, SD = .505) than non-switchers (M = .03, SD = .17), t(42) = -3.31, p = 
.002. Interestingly, however, the experimental group as a whole, regardless of switching, 
also showed differences in the number of trials delayed between the first and second half 
of trials on the modified delay task. Delayers delayed more trials in the first half (M = 
2.30, SD = 1.31) and less trials in the second half (M = 1.91, SD = 1.42), t(32) = 2.42, p = 
.021. Non-delayers delayed less trials in the first half (M = 0.89, SD = 1.18) and more 
trials in the second half (M = 1.27, SD = 1.44), t(43) = -1.95, p = .058. When groups were 
further broken down into switchers and non-switchers, the same patterns of delaying 
remained. However, likely due to small cell sizes, these differences were not significant, 
except for the group of delayers who switched. They delayed more trials in the first half 
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(M = 1.31, SD = 1.01) and less trials in the second (M = .75, SD = .775), t(15) = 2.33, p = 
.034.  
In the experimental group, contrary to predictions, switching was not related to 
age, as shown in Table 2, χ2(1, N = 77) = 3.50, p = .365. It was also unrelated to sex, 
χ2(1, N = 77) = .15, p = .114 and PPVT, t(75) = 1.32, p = .189. As predicted, it was 
related to baseline behavior, with 48.0% of delayers switching and only 25.0% of non-
delayers switching, χ2(1, N = 77) = 4.57, p = .029 (see Table 2), although after applying a 
Bonferroni corrected alpha rate of .0125 (.05/4), it was no longer significant. 
To examine whether children recognized which panel was the better choice, 
which may have facilitated switching, children’s self-reported preferences regarding the 
two panels were analyzed. Preference data were available for 72 children in the 
experimental group. Of the 25 children who switched, all but 2 (92.0%) identified the 
non-risky panel as their favorite, consistent with their behavioral responses. In contrast, 
of the 47 children who did not switch, 26 (55.3%) favored the risky panel and 21 (44.7%) 
favored the non-risky panel, significantly different from the pattern seen with switchers, 
χ2(1, N = 72) = 15.38 p = .000. Interestingly, in the group of non-switchers, almost half 
of the children favored the non-risky panel, although it was inconsistent with their 
behavior. 
EF Scale. One of the main hypotheses was that children’s ability to switch would 
be positively related to set-shifting, as indexed by the highest level passed on the EF 
Scale (0 to 7). An analysis of covariance was conducted with the highest level passed as 
the dependent variable, and switching and baseline delaying as independent variables, 
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controlling for age and verbal ability. Both age and verbal ability have been shown to 
relate positively to the EF Scale (Beck et al., 2011). Results revealed that age was 
significantly related to EF Scale performance, F(1, 71) = 39.88, p = .000, partial η2 = .36 
as was PPVT standard scores, F(1, 71) = 9.66, p = .003, partial η2 = .12. Controlling for 
both age and PPVT, switching was a significant predictor of EF Scale performance, F(1, 
71) = 5.09, p = .027, partial η2 = .07. Adjusted means controlling for age and PPVT 
showed that switchers had a mean score of 3.78 (SE = .20) and non-switchers had a mean 
score of 3.21 (SE = .15). As hypothesized, baseline delaying was not a significant 
predictor, F(1, 71) = .84, p = .362, and the interaction between switching and baseline 
delaying was also not significant, F(1, 71) = 1.14, p = .290.   
CBQ. Two-tailed Pearson correlation analyses were conducted and are presented 
in Table 3. Contrary to predictions, baseline delaying was unrelated to Surgency, and also 
unrelated to Negative Affect, and Effortful Control. Switching was marginally correlated 
with Negative Affect, with those scoring higher on Negative Affect less likely to switch, 
r = -.21, p = .06. Switching was not correlated with Effortful Control, although Effortful 
control was marginally related to EF Scale r = .15, p = .08. Given results indicating that it 
was easier for delayers to switch compared to non-delayers, and that switching may be 
slightly different in these groups, separate correlational analyses were conducted for 
delayers and non-delayers. In delayers, switching was again marginally related to 
Negative Affect, r = -.30, p = .08, but unrelated to Effortful Control. In non-delayers, 
switching was unrelated to Negative Affect, but marginally related to Effortful Control, 
with those showing higher effortful control more likely to switch, r = -.28, p = .07. In this 
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group, however, Effortful Control was correlated with EF Scale performance, r = .33, p = 
.03, and if this relation was controlled, then Effortful Control was no longer related to 
switching.  
Discussion  
We were interested in whether children would be able to modify their behavior in 
a delay of gratification choice task when the context changed and their preferred response 
became risky and no longer adaptive. Indeed results showed that children were able to 
adapt their behaviors, but children varied in their responses, with some children switching 
and others not switching. Less than half of the children changed their behavior, but a 
greater percentage of switching was observed in the direction of delaying to non-
delaying. As mentioned earlier, it may indicate that shifting towards the consumption of 
rewards is easier and requires less control than shifting towards waiting. Furthermore, 
switchers could be differentiated from non-switchers by the first trial, suggesting that 
presenting new information and contingencies can be enough to cue a shift in children’s 
behavior. However, as results also indicated that for all children, both switchers and non-
switchers, the latter half of trials showed a greater shift towards the non-risky choice than 
the first half of trials, it suggests that negative feedback from losing their treats may 
facilitate switching behavior over time. Nonetheless, despite being aware of the new risk 
context, and being somewhat responsive to it, some children may not fully adapt their 
behavior. Interestingly, a subset of children who were unable to demonstrate full 
switching behavior still stated a preference for the non-risky option. Some children may 
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have understood or recognized the better choice, and may have even marginally shifted 
their behavior, but did not fully follow through. 
It was hypothesized that switching would be associated with age and set-shifting 
skills. As predicted, children who were able to adjust their responses on the delay 
paradigm scored higher on the EF Scale, controlling for age and verbal ability. This 
suggests that EF skills, as measured independently in a cool abstract task, may be 
recruited in situations of a hot nature, where children must adjust their behavior to the 
environment in an adaptive manner. As discussed previously, performance in hot tasks 
are not consistently related to behavior in cool tasks, and in particular, delay of 
gratification is typically not related to measures of set-shifting. Surprisingly, no age 
differences in switching were observed, although age itself was strongly related to set-
shifting, and switching was independently related to set-shifting. It is possible that a 
wider age range may be needed to reveal developmental differences. 
There were also no significant age differences in baseline delaying, although there 
was a trend towards older children delaying more often, consistent with mixed findings in 
the literature. Females were more likely to delay at baseline than males, which has been 
previously reported in the literature (see Silverman, 2003). Also consistent with past 
findings, the delay choice task was not related to verbal ability or set-shifting (e.g., Beck 
et al., 2011; Hongwanishkul et al., 2005; Schwarz et al., 1983). 
With regards to children’s temperament, it was predicted that baseline delaying 
would show relations to surgency and negative affect, but this was not observed. It is 
possible that given the complex nature of delay, these reactive aspects of temperament 
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may not be as prominent in light of other influences on behavior. Interestingly, switching 
was negatively associated with negative affect. Children who perseverated on their 
baseline response during the modified task often displayed high frustration and negative 
affect at continually losing their treats. Those prone to negative emotionality may 
experience such reactions more strongly and find it more difficult to disengage from the 
negative emotion to flexibly shift their behavior.  
Associations have also been reported between higher negative affect and lower 
effortful control (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1997; Kochanska, Coy, Tjebkes, & Husarek, 
1998). Lower effortful control may hinder switching behavior, although no relation 
between negative affect and effortful control was observed in the current study. Garon 
and Moore (2006) also reported that preschoolers who scored higher on negative affect 
did more poorly on a children’s gambling task. The task involves two decks of cards, an 
advantageous deck with lower gains, but also lower losses, and a disadvantageous deck 
with higher gains, but also higher loses. Although initially the disadvantageous deck may 
seem attractive, as children continue to select cards, over time the deck results in overall 
losses. Thus this task also assesses flexibility, as children potentially need to switch their 
selections from the risky deck to the non-risky over the course of the task.  
As predicted, switching was related to effortful control, but this was only 
observed in non-delayers, and not delayers. Our results suggest that it is more difficult for 
children to switch from not delaying to delaying, and in such situations, control processes 
may be more important in flexibly modulating reactive behavior, and show stronger 
relations. Effortful control was also related to set-shifting, and when controlled, the 
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relation between switching and effortful control was no longer significant. This points to 
the potential overlap between effortful control and EF and their role in facilitating 
flexible behavior.  
There are, however, several limitations of the current study. By using risk to 
manipulate the adaptiveness of the context, a potential confound was introduced, where 
children who continued to select the risky option may have been attracted to risk-taking 
rather than unable to adapt to the changed context. An attraction to the risky option would 
also make it more difficult for these children to switch their behavior, in contrast to other 
children who are more risk-aversive and can be easily induced to shift away from risk. 
Nonetheless, this concern is mitigated by the fact that the control group did not show any 
substantial shifting towards the risky option, which would be expected if attraction to 
risk-taking was a strong influence on behavior. In this experimental paradigm, it was also 
behaviorally difficult to disentangle persistence and extinction (Happaney & Zelazo, 
2004). When children fail to switch, they may be perseverating at a no-longer rewarded 
response, or they may be demonstrating persistence in reaching a desired goal. Children 
were led to believe that there was a chance treats could bypass the box, and continuing to 
choose the risky option could reasonably be an example of persistence. With continued 
trials and consistent negative feedback, however, expectations of obtaining treats should 
be diminished. Furthermore, in the current task, children were given an alternative 
response option where rewards were guaranteed, albeit not in their preferred manner or 
amount, which reduces the need to persist at a risky response. 
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In Study 2, these issues were addressed by employing a savings paradigm that did 
not involve an explicit introduction of risk, but used past experience to signal relevant 
contingencies and information in the situation. This also provided a more ecological real-
world problem that children may encounter, without reliance on a risky situation that is 
artificially designed. Furthermore, the outcomes of children’s choices would not be 
characterized by uncertainty with regards to whether their responses may be rewarded or 
not, but would be clear from their past experiences. 
Study 2  
One of the goals was to examine children’s flexibility in at least two different 
paradigms examining closely related but different decision-making behaviors. If similar 
findings regarding children’s flexibility and their relation to EF can be demonstrated, it 
would strengthen our confidence that these relations are not specific to a particular 
paradigm or manipulation but may indicate some broader function. As discussed, saving 
behavior is similar to delay of gratification in some respects, such as the need to control 
impulses toward immediate consumption or rewards. Saving differs from delaying, 
however, in that it may be more future-oriented, and it involves giving up a present 
consumption, that cannot be recovered, for a future consumption. The marbles saving 
paradigm (Metcalf & Atance, 2011) was used to measure flexibility in children’s saving 
behavior. It allows a replication of Study 1 using a more realistic situation with which 
children are familiar, and also eliminates confounds associated with risk-taking and with 
persistence. Saving behavior as measured by this task furthermore appears to be sensitive 
to past experience, as reported by Metcalf and Atance (2011), and children’s saving 
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behavior can be influenced by the context and experience (Otto, 2003). The delay choice 
tasks was also included in Study 2 to assess whether baseline saving and baseline 
delaying would be related. It was expected that given their similarities, but also 
considering the complexity of these tasks, saving and delaying would be weakly or 
moderately related.  
The marbles saving task involves giving children a limited number of marbles 
during play with a small marbles game and measuring how many marbles are saved for 
use with a later big marbles game. Children’s baseline preference for saving was assessed 
during the small marbles game. Children who did not save marbles were unable to play 
with the big marbles game. A modification to the task was introduced such that children 
who saved marbles were also unable to play with the big marbles game, which was 
revealed to be broken. In the former case, the presentation of the big marbles game as 
promised should emphasize the certainty of future need for marbles, and that no extra 
marbles are available. In the latter case, the presentation of the broken big marbles game 
should emphasize the certainty of no future need for marbles. This experience should 
encourage children to adjust their subsequent behavior when given the chance to play the 
game a second time.  
Assuming similar results on children’s flexibility could be replicated in Study 2, 
we were additionally interested in whether flexibility in these experimental contexts 
would be reflected in flexibility in children’s everyday lives. During the preschool years, 
children’s behavior becomes more ritualistic, repetitive, compulsive, and perseverative, 
and in fact, can be characterized by increased inflexibility (Evans et al., 1997; Evans, 
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Lewis, & Iobst, 2004). During this time, parents often report that children insist on strict 
invariable routines, have strong likes and dislikes, demand repetition, display high 
sensory-perceptual awareness, and are often being bothered by small details and changes. 
Becoming prevalent by age 2 and decreasing by age 6, Evans et al. (1997) argue that 
while these behaviors resemble those seen in adults with obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
they may be a normative part of development, and may involve emotional regulation and 
anxiety reduction (Evans, Gray & Leckman 1999). To measure these ritualistic and 
compulsive behaviors in early childhood, Evans and colleagues (1997) developed a 
parent-report measure, the Childhood Routine Inventory (CRI). We predicted that 
children who show flexibility in saving behavior would have less reported compulsive 
behaviors, as measured by the CRI. 
Considering our observations that flexibility as measured by our experimental 
paradigm was positively associated with set-shifting, we also predicted that greater set-
shifting would be associated with less compulsive behaviors. Pietrefesa and Evans (2007) 
reported that CRI measures of compulsive behaviors were negatively associated with set-
shifting and response inhibition in 4- to 6-year-olds, which mirror findings of obsessive-
compulsive behaviors and poor set-shifting in adults (e.g., Lucey et al., 1997; Zohar, 
LaBuda, & Moschel-Ravid, 1995). Furthermore, effortful control may also be related to 
less compulsive behaviors, given its overlapping relationship with EF. 
Method 
Participants. A new sample of children was recruited from the same population 
using the same methods and screening criteria described in Study 1. Three 3.5-year-old 
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boys failed to start or complete the tasks due to fatigue, lack of interest, or 
noncompliance, and were excluded. The final sample consisted of 142 children, including 
73 3.5-year-olds (M = 42.13 months, SD = .48, 36 females), and 69 4.5-year-olds (M = 
53.91 months, SD = .52, 36 females). Similar to Study 1, the majority of children were 
White and non-Hispanic (88.0%), with the remaining sample consisting of children of 
White and Hispanic, African-American, Asian, and mixed ethnicity. Families were 
predominantly two caregiver households (94.4%) and the majority of primary caregivers, 
mostly mothers, reported attaining a bachelors degree or higher (88.7%). The median and 
mode household income was $100 000 to $124 999. 
Procedure and Measures. Children were tested in the same lab environment as 
in Study 1, and parents completed the same demographics questionnaire. Children were 
first administered the standard delay choice task, to replicate findings regarding baseline 
delaying, and examine its relation to saving, followed by the marbles saving task to 
determine their baseline preference for saving. Children were shown both a small marbles 
game and a big marbles game. Children were told they would play first with the small 
game, and then later with the big game. However, children were given only 3 marbles, 
and therefore, must save at least 1 of the 3 marbles while playing the small game in order 
to have marbles to play the big game. Given the reported low to moderate level of saving 
(Metcalf & Atance, 2011), children who saved at least one marble were categorized as 
savers, and those who saved no marbles were categorized as spenders. Children were 
randomly assigned to an experimental or control condition.  
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In the experimental condition, spenders were given the opportunity to play with 
the big marbles game, but without marbles, children were unable to play. Savers were 
given the opportunity to play with the big marbles game, but they discovered that it was 
broken and not playable. In the control condition, children did not spend time with the 
big marbles game, but were told the experimenter made a mistake and they would play it 
later. Thus the control group did not receive any intervening feedback experience 
between the first and second playing of the small marbles game. A total of 102 children 
were assigned to the experimental condition, including 53 3.5-year-olds (26 females), and 
49 4.5-year-olds (25 females). A total of 40 children were assigned to the control 
condition, including 20 3.5-year-olds (10 females) and 20 4.5-year-olds (11 females).  
All children then completed a receptive vocabulary test after which the 
experimenter discovered 3 additional marbles. Children were given the chance to play 
with the small marbles game again, followed by the big marbles game. Using the same 
criteria above, children were again categorized as savers or spenders based on their 
saving behavior. Children who changed classifications across the two administrations of 
the savings task were categorized as switchers (e.g., saver to spender), whereas those who 
did not change classifications were categorized as non-switchers (e.g., remained saver). 
At the end of the second saving task, children were allowed to play with a third even 
bigger marbles game with extra marbles, followed by an independent measure of set-
shifting.  
Marbles Saving Task. This task was adapted from a paradigm developed by 
Metcalf and Atance (2011). Children were introduced to a small marbles game with a 
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single run/chute and a more appealing big marbles game with 3 runs/chutes (see Figure 
2). The experimenter demonstrated with the small game how once a marble was dropped 
down the start hole, it rolled into a box where it could not be retrieved or used again 
(“Once you put a marble down the hole, it rolls all the way down and it goes into the box. 
It stays inside and you can’t use it again”). It was explained that both games worked the 
same way. Children would first play with the small marbles game for 3 minutes, followed 
by the big marbles game for 3 minutes. They were shown a transparent bag with marbles 
and it was emphasized that there were only 3 marbles left (“Look, there are only 3 
marbles left. You only get 3 marbles to use for all your marble games today. Remember 
once you put a marble down the hole, you can’t use it again”). The big marbles game was 
removed from the room and then rule checks were administered. Children were asked 
which game they were going to play with now and which game they were going to play 
with later. Incorrect answers were corrected and rule checks were repeated a second time.  
Before handing children the marbles, children’s choices were explicitly stated 
(“You can use some marbles now for the small game. You can also save some marbles 
for later for the big game.”). Children were given the bag of marbles, and the 
experimenter started a timer for 3 minutes and retreated to a corner to work while the 
children played. To discourage interaction, the experimenter wore headphones and 
minimized conversation, replying as needed with neutral statements such as “Remember I 
need to work right now.” When the timer rang, another rule check was administered. 
Children were asked if they remembered what they would do or play now, and incorrect 
answers were corrected. The small marbles game was removed, and the big marbles 
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game was retrieved from the other room, and children were given 3 minutes with the big 
marbles game.  
For savers, a switch was made such that, unbeknownst to the child, a different big 
marbles game was retrieved that was identical in outward appearance, but on closer 
inspection, had putty hidden in various tubes, blocking the marble pathways. The 
experimenter expressed surprise at discovering that the big game was broken, bringing 
children’s attention to the putty (“Oh no, I think the big game might be broken! See the 
sticky stuff? There’s some here and here. I think the marbles won’t go down now and 
they might get stuck inside!”). Children were prompted to try a marble to confirm that it 
would get stuck. Any remaining marbles were collected to prevent children from 
entertaining themselves with the marbles.  
In both cases, children spent 3 minutes with the big marbles game, but were 
unable to play with it, either because they lacked marbles, or because the game was 
broken. In the control group, the experimenter told children that a mistake was made and 
they had to play another game first before the big marbles game. Children did not spend 
time with the big marbles game and instead were directly administered the vocabulary 
test. After all children completed the vocabulary test, the experimenter discovered 
another 3 marbles and exclaimed that they would play the same game again, and the 
initial instructions regarding the small and big marbles game were repeated. Regardless 
of performance, all children were given extra marbles so that all children had 5 marbles 
to play with a surprise extra big marbles game. 
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Delay Choice Baseline. The delay choice baseline task (e.g., Prencipe & Zelazo, 
2005; Thompson et al., 1997) used in Study 1 was administered with the same stimuli 
and instructions. There were 9 trials in total balanced across three types of contingencies 
(i.e., 1 versus 2, 1 versus 4, 1 versus 6) presented in a fixed mixed order, using a food 
treat chosen by the child. For each test trial, children were presented with a choice 
between one treat now and more treats later. 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-4). The standardized test of receptive 
vocabulary (Dunn & Dunn, 2007) used in Study 1 was administered according to 
standard administration. Children were shown a series of pages with pictures, and for 
each page, children were asked to point to 1 of 4 pictures that corresponded to a word 
spoken by the experimenter.  
Executive Function Scale (EF Scale™). The EF Scale (Carlson, 2012) used and 
described in Study 1 was administered as an independent measure of set-shifting and 
cognitive flexibility. The EF Scale is a card-sorting task with 7 levels of complexity. The 
starting level for 3.5-year-olds, and 4.5-year-olds was level 3 and level 4, respectively. 
When children passed a level, more difficult levels were administered until children 
failed. If children failed the initial level, easier levels were administered in a backward 
fashion until children passed. In this manner, the highest level at which children could 
pass was determined. In the current study, the standardized newer protocol was used, 
with 5 trials in both pre-switch and post-switch. Children were required to sort 4 out 5 
cards correctly in both pre-switch and post-switch to pass a level. Children’s performance 
across Study 1 and 2 were comparable as measured by the highest level passed, with 
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similar mean performance for the two age groups, and similar relations seen with other 
variables such as age and verbal ability. This suggests that the number of trials likely did 
not affect the highest level passed, and the two versions of the task used across studies 
were comparable.  
Children’s Behavior Questionnaire Very Short Form (CBQ-VSF). Parents 
were asked to complete the Very Short Form of the CBQ (Putnam & Rothbart, 2006) as 
in Study 1. Parents rated how often certain behaviors were true of their children in the 
last 6 months on a 7-point Likert scale, which resulted in three factors or dimensions (i.e., 
Surgency, Negative Affect, Effortful Control).  
Childhood Routines Inventory (CRI). Parents completed the CRI (Evans et al., 
1997), which consisted of 19-items describing various compulsive, ritualistic, and 
repetitive behaviors children may engage in (e.g., “Strongly prefer to stick to one game or 
activity rather than change to a new one”). Parents were asked to rate how often each 
behavior occurred on a 5-point Likert scale. A total mean score for compulsive behaviors 
was calculated from averaging all items, and two factors were calculated based on 
specific items that had been shown to load together (see Evan et al., 1997). A Just Right 
factor was derived from averaging 5 items that captured children’s sensory-perceptual 
need to have things be carried out or arranged in a particular way (e.g., “Lines up objects 
in straight lines or symmetrical patterns”). A Repetitive Behaviors factor was derived 
from averaging 4 items that captured children’s repetitive behaviors and need for things 
to be the same (e.g., “Prefers the same household schedule or routine every day”).   
Results    
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Descriptive. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical analyses unless 
otherwise noted. All children completed all tasks, although 2 children in the experimental 
group did not complete the delay choice task. No statistical differences were found 
between the experimental and control groups with respect to age, sex, baseline delaying, 
baseline saving, PPVT, or EF Scale, and therefore, the two groups were combined for 
baseline analyses. For more direct comparison with Study 1, children were classified as 
delayers (6 to 9 trials) and non-delayers (0 to 3 trials), with those scoring in the mid-
range omitted from delay analyses. Of the remaining 105 children, 47 children (44.8%) 
were delayers and 58 children (55.2%) were non-delayers. Unlike in Study 1, here the 
proportion of delayers and non-delayers did not differ from chance according to a 
binomial test, p = .329. There was a significant age difference, with 27 out of 44 children 
(61.4%) delaying in 4.5-year-olds, and 20 out of 61 children (32.8%) delaying in 3.5-
year-olds, χ2(1, N = 105) = 8.44, p = .003. Delaying was also marginally related to sex, 
with 29 out 55 females (52.7%) delaying, compared to only 18 out of 50 males (36.0%) 
delaying, χ2(1, N = 105) = 2.96, p = .063. There was no relation with PPVT scores, t(102) 
= -.46, p = .648. Analyses were rerun categorizing delayers (5 to 9 trials) and non-
delayers (0 to 4 trials) without excluding children, and results were comparable. After 
applying a Bonferroni corrected alpha rate of .0165 (.05/3), age differences remained 
significant.  
During the baseline saving task, only 37 children (26.1%) were classified as 
savers and 105 children (73.9%) as spenders. This was significantly different from 
chance as indicated by a binomial test, p = .000. As seen in Table 4, children’s baseline 
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status as a saver or spender was unrelated to age, χ2(1, N = 142) = 1.34, p = .167, and sex, 
χ2(1, N = 142) = 2.07, p = .106. Saving was also unrelated to baseline delaying, χ2(1, N = 
105) = 1.65, p = .148. When analyses were rerun without excluding children in our 
categorization of delayers and non-delayers, there was a marginally significant 
relationship. Of the 37 savers, 21 were delayers (56.8%), whereas of the 103 spenders, 
only 43 were delayers (41.7%), χ2(1, N = 140) = 2.47, p = .084. Savers also scored 
significantly higher on PPVT (M = 127.28, SD = 10.82) than spenders (M = 117.95, SD = 
13.28), t(138) = -3.80, p = .000. PPVT differences remained significant after applying a 
Bonferroni corrected alpha rate of .0125 (0.05/4).  
Switching. In the experimental group, 43 of 102 children (42.2%) switched, 
which was significantly higher than the 5 of 40 children (12.5%) who spontaneous 
switched in the control group, χ2(1, N = 142) = 11.30, p = .000. This suggests that the 
manipulation was effective. Switching was unrelated to baseline saving, although the 
proportion of switching was slightly higher when switching from saving to spending. As 
shown in Table 5, 50.0% of savers switched from saving to spending, whereas 39.7% of 
spenders switched from spending to saving, χ2(1, N = 102) = .80, p = .256. In the 
experimental group, switching was related to age, with 65.3% of 4.5-year-olds switching 
compared to only 20.8% of 3.5-year-olds switching, χ2(1, N = 102) = 20.72, p = .000 (see 
Table 5). More females than males switched, with 26 of 51 females (51.0%) switching, 
compared to 17 of 51 males (33.3%) switching, although this difference was only 
marginally significant, χ2(1, N = 102) = 3.26, p = .054. Switching was also related to 
PPVT, with switchers (M = 123.37, SD  = 13.39) scoring higher standard scores than 
   46 
 
non-switchers (M = 117.68, SD = 12.99), t(100) = -2.16, p = .033. After applying a 
Bonferroni corrected alpha rate of .0125 (.05/4), only age differences remained 
significant.  
To examine whether children recognized which was the adaptive choice, 
children’s self-reported preferences for playing the small game or waiting for the big 
game were analyzed. Preference data were available for 98 children in the experimental 
group. Of the 12 savers who switched to spending, 9 children (75.0%) reported preferring 
to play with the small game, consistent with their behavior. Of the 11 savers who did not 
switch to spending, 6 children (54.5%) reported preferring to play with the small game, 
inconsistent with their behavior. Of the 31 spenders who switched to saving, 29 children 
(93.5%) reported preferring waiting for the big game, consistent with their behavior. Of 
the 44 spenders who did not switch to saving, 36 children (81.8%) reported preferring to 
wait for the big game, inconsistent with their lack of saving. Examining both savers and 
spenders together, of the 43 switchers, only 5 (11.6%) reported an inconsistent 
preference, whereas of the 55 non-switchers, 42 (76.4%) reported an inconsistent 
preference, χ2(1, N = 98) = 40.52, p = .000. These results are to those observed in Study 
1, and suggest that some children may have recognized the better choice, despite not 
demonstrating it in behavior.  
EF Scale. As in Study 1, one of the main hypotheses was that children’s ability to 
switch would be positively related to set-shifting as assessed using the EF Scale. An 
analysis of covariance was conducted with the highest level passed as the dependent 
variable, and switching and baseline saving as independent variables, controlling for age 
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and verbal ability. Results revealed that age was significantly related to EF Scale 
performance, F(1, 96) = 47.05, p = .000, partial η2 = .33, as were PPVT standard scores, 
F(1, 96) = 4.24, p = .042, partial η2 = .04. Controlling for both age and PPVT, switching 
on the marbles task was a significant predictor of EF Scale performance, F(1, 96) = 6.43, 
p = .013, partial η2 = .06. Adjusted means controlling for age and PPVT showed that 
switchers had a mean score of 4.03 (SE = .17) and non-switchers had a mean score of 
3.23 (SE = .14). Baseline saving was a marginally significant predictor, F(1, 96) = 3.04, p 
= .084, partial η2 = .03, with an adjusted mean of 3.98 for savers (SE = .216) and an 
adjusted mean of 3.55 for spenders (SE = .119). The interaction between switching and 
baseline saving was also marginally significant, F(1, 96) = 2.98 p = .088, partial η2 = .03.  
Given the marginally significant results, separate analyses of covariance, 
controlling for age and PPVT, were conducted for savers and spenders. Switching was 
not a significant predictor of EF Scale performance in savers, F(1, 20) = .19, p = .665, 
with adjusted means of 4.30 (SE = .29) for switchers and 4.12 (SE = .29) for non-
switchers. Switching was a significant predictor of EF Scale performance in spenders, 
F(1, 74) = 9.34, p = .003, partial η2 = .11, with adjusted means of 3.95 (SE = .22) for 
switchers and 2.99 (SE = .17) for non-switchers.  
 CBQ. Two-tailed Pearson correlation analyses were conducted and are presented 
in Table 6. Contrary to predictions, baseline delaying was unrelated to Surgency, and it 
was also unrelated to Effortful Control. Interestingly, delaying was positively related to 
Negative Affect, with delayers more likely to have higher reported negative affect, r = 
.25, p = .01. Baseline saving was unrelated to all three CBQ dimensions. Switching was 
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significantly correlated with Effortful Control, r = .21, p = .01, but unrelated to Negative 
Affect, as was observed in Study 1. Unlike Study 1, Effortful Control was unrelated to 
the EF Scale, but was correlated with PPVT, r = .20, p = .02. Controlling for PPVT, since 
it was also related to switching, the relation between switching and Effortful Control 
remained significant, r = .22, p = .03. Given results indicating that it was easier for savers 
to switch compared to spenders, and that switching may be slightly different in these 
groups, separate correlational analyses were conducted for savers and spenders. In savers, 
switching was significantly related to Effortful Control, r = .43, p = .04, which remained 
significant after controlling for PPVT, r = .43, p = .04. In spenders, switching was 
marginally related to Effortful Control, r = .21 p = .06, although it became non-
significant after controlling for PPVT, r = .16, p = .17.  
 CRI. Two-tailed Pearson correlation analyses were conducted and are presented 
in Table 6. Neither baseline delaying or saving were related to compulsive behaviors. 
Interestingly, sex was associated with Just Right behaviors, r = -.22, p = .01, and Total 
behaviors, r = -.17 p = .04 with males showing more compulsive behaviors than females. 
Switching was unrelated to compulsive behaviors. However, EF Scale was marginally 
related to Repetitive behaviors with greater EF associated with less repetitive behaviors, r 
= -.15, p = .08. Effortful Control was positively related to Just Right behaviors, r = .21, p 
= .01 and marginally to Total behaviors, r = .16, p = .06, with those scoring higher on 
effortful control also scoring higher on compulsive behaviors. Negative Affect was 
positively related to Just Right behaviors, r = .34, p = .00 and Total behaviors, r = .33, p 
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= .00, and marginally to Repetitive behaviors, r = .16, p = .06. Surgency was negatively 
related to Just Right behaviors, r = -.34, p = .00 and Total behaviors, r = -.24, p = .00.  
Discussion 
In the present study, we attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1 using a 
different paradigm that assessed saving behavior. More children were categorized as 
spenders than savers, similar to Study 1, where more children were categorized as non-
delayers than delayers. However, the rate of saving was particularly low, lower than that 
of delaying, at only 26.1%. This was lower than the 39% rate of saving reported by 
Metcalf and Atance (2011).   
In particular, we were interested in whether children would be able to modify 
their saving behavior based on past experiences that provided information about the 
environmental context with respect to contingencies and rewards. In general, the results 
were replicated those from the first study. A comparable proportion of children switched 
their behavior, 35.1% in Study 1 and 42.2% in Study 2. The proportion of switchers in 
the saving paradigm was similar to that reported by Metcalf and Atance (2011), who 
reported 39% of spenders switched to saving during a second trial, which is the same 
proportion in spenders, 39.7%, observed in Study 2. A greater proportion of children 
switched from saving to spending, which mirrors findings from Study 1 that showed 
more switching from delaying to not delaying. Unlike the delay choice task, the savings 
task involved one-trial learning, where children only had the opportunity for feedback on 
one trial. However, children were still able to adjust their responses, consistent with our 
finding that switchers and non-switchers in the delay choice paradigm could be 
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differentiated by their first delay trial before having a chance to learn through subsequent 
trials. Replicating the findings from Study 1, many of the children who were unable to 
switch stated a preference for the adaptive choice, which was not reflected in their 
behavior. It suggests that while they could not behaviorally switch their response, they 
appeared to recognize the better choice.  
Switchers, as before, scored higher on set-shifting, controlling for age and verbal 
ability. When savers and spenders were analyzed separately, results showed that this 
relation may be stronger in spenders who need to shift towards saving. In spenders, the 
adjusted mean difference between switchers and non-switchers was equivalent to a level 
on the EF Scale. Unlike the first study, age differences were clearly observed. Older 
children were more likely to switch than younger children. Compared to the delay choice 
task, the savings task may require more complex understanding of casual connections 
between various elements in the task, such as how the small and big marbles game events 
were related, and how children’s actions had consequences for the games. There was also 
no explicit instruction about the consequences (i.e., if you use all your marbles, you will 
have none left for the big game) as there was during the delay choice modified task (i.e., 
treats may be lost in the box). Children’s choices of saving or not saving were, however, 
clearly presented. Consistent with this view is that verbal ability, which may help in 
understanding more complex tasks, was related to baseline saving and marginally related 
to switching. 
Future-oriented thinking might also have played a bigger role in this task, and 
prior research suggests developmental change during the preschool years (see Atance & 
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O’Neill, 2005). An important aspect of adaptive and flexible behavior concerns the 
ability to consider our future selves and use such considerations to guide our current 
behaviors. Children’s ability to understand the concept of future time and to consider 
their future selves develops during the preschool years (see Atance & O’Neill, 2005 for 
review). Some studies have suggested that young children have difficulty planning for 
future novel events, which improves between the ages of 3 and 5 years (e.g., Russell, 
Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von 
Gehlen, 2011). However, others have found that under less demands, such as the absence 
of strong semantically related distractors, even 3-year-olds can select items needed for a 
future scenario (Atance & Meltzoff, 2006).  
Beyond verbal ability, baseline saving was not strongly related to other variables, 
which was similar to baseline delaying. While sex differences were seen for baseline 
delaying, with females delaying more, this was not the case for baseline saving, although 
females were marginally more like to switch in a savings context. In past paradigms 
assessing children’s saving behavior, others have not found reliable sex differences (e.g., 
Otto et al., 2006; Sonuga-Barke & Webley, 1993). There was also some indication that 
baseline saving may be positively related to baseline delaying, although results were only 
observed when no children were excluded.  
In general, the main results across both studies showed parallel patterns of older 
children and females delaying more often at baseline, although no such relations were 
seen in baseline saving, a weak relationship between baseline behaviors and set-shifting, 
a trends towards more switching to immediate rewards, and significant relations between 
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switching in a hot task context and set-shifting in a cool task context. Main findings of 
both studies are summarized in Table 7 for ease of comparison.  
 With regards to children’s temperament, as in Study 1, baseline delaying was 
unrelated to surgency, although it was related to negative affect, with those showing 
greater negative affect more likely to delay. Greater fear and inhibited behavior, which 
may itself reduce approach tendencies, may make it easier to resist immediate rewards. 
Baseline saving, however, was unrelated to the three temperament dimensions. Switching 
was significantly related to effortful control, with switchers having higher reported 
effortful control. This was also observed in Study 1, but only in non-delayers. Here 
effortful control was unrelated to set-shifting, and thus the relation between switching 
and effortful control could not be explained by set-shifting. Interestingly, it suggests that 
perhaps, while there is some overlap between effortful control and EF, both may have 
independent contributions to switching behavior. The relation between switching and 
negative affect seen in Study 1 was not replicated here. It may be that 9 trials of 
repeatedly losing treats during the delay choice modified paradigm elicited greater 
frustration and negative emotion. In the marbles saving paradigm, there was only a one-
time frustration event, although it lasted for 3 minutes.   
 In Study 2 we added a questionnaire assessing children’s ritualistic and 
compulsive behaviors to assess whether flexibility as assessed in our experimental 
paradigms would be related to flexibility in children’s everyday behaviors. Contrary to 
predictions, switching was unrelated to compulsive behaviors, although compulsive 
behaviors were related to other variables associated with switching. For example, males 
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were reported to have more compulsive behaviors, and interestingly, males were also less 
likely to switch their saving behavior. Set-shifting was marginally related to repetitive 
behaviors, with greater scores on shifting predicting lower reported repetitive behaviors. 
An inclination towards repetitive behaviors may be associated also with a tendency 
toward perseverative behaviors, which is related to poor performance on set-shifting tasks 
(e.g., Pietrefesa & Evans, 2007). Compulsive behaviors, particularly “just right” 
behaviors, were also associated positively with effortful control. Although the positive 
association seems counterintuitive, it may be that effortful control is required to maintain 
“just right” aspects in children’s environment. Moreover, the subscale of effortful control 
includes items related to perceptual sensitivity, which is a characteristic of compulsive 
behaviors as assessed by the CRI. Compulsive behaviors were also positively related to 
negative affect. This is consistent with previous findings indicating that compulsive 
behaviors are associated with fears and phobias (e.g., Evans et al., 1999; Pietrefesa & 
Evans, 2007). Items related to fear are included in the Negative Affect subscale. 
Surgency, which is typically negatively associated with negative affect, as was observed 
in the two present studies, was negatively related to compulsive behaviors. 
General Discussion  
The ability to adjust one’s behavior flexibly in response to different situations is 
an important aspect of adaptive functioning. What constitutes adaptive or rational 
behavior changes with the environment and with current internal goals, states, and 
motivations. Sometimes it is better to exert control; other times, it is better to let go. 
Across two paradigms investigating two hot decision-making behaviors, children’s 
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responses were indeed sensitive to contextual changes and past experience, confirming 
previous findings in the delay of gratification literature. Children were able to flexibly 
adjust their behavior in both directions, towards delaying and saving, and towards 
immediate consumption. More interestingly, however, individual differences emerged 
with respect to this flexibility of behavior, with some children switching to new 
responses, and others perseverating on old responses. Children who adjusted their 
behavior were differentiated by greater EF, specifically set-shifting. This finding suggests 
that certain EF skills may underlie the adaptation of behavior to different environmental 
demands, whether it requires one to exert or to relinquish control.    
However, the need and recruitment of EF may vary depending on the direction of 
change required and its difficulty. There was a trend towards greater switching in the 
direction of immediate consumption. In Kesek et al. (2011), their implicit priming 
procedure appeared more effective in shifting children towards immediate rewards, 
Bandura and Mischel (1965) found stronger and more reliable effects with delayers 
responding to a live model encouraging immediate gratification, and similarly, a large 
decline in waiting time was observed when children interacted with an unreliable 
experimenter (Kidd et al., 2013). It may be easier to bias individuals towards immediate 
gratification as most individuals are drawn to appetitive rewards and waiting is typically 
aversive. Accordingly, such a switch may be less taxing on executive processes, and 
potentially require less EF. In fact, when savers and spenders were analyzed separately in 
Study 2, results suggested that the relation between switching and EF may be stronger 
when switching from spending to saving than the reverse. Moreover, in Study 1, 
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switching and effortful control was correlated in only non-delayers who needed to switch 
towards delaying. 
Considering children’s well-documented gains in EF during the preschool years 
(e.g., Carlson, 2005; Zelazo & Müller, 2002), age was surprisingly not consistently 
related to switching. Age differences were observed during the saving paradigm, but not 
during the delay choice paradigm. The saving paradigm was more complex, requiring 
children to make more connections regarding the task with less explicit guidance. Factors 
related to age and development may be most relevant in such problems that demand 
greater perception and understanding of social situations, complex causal connections, 
and various contingencies. 
While there was a consistent relation observed between EF and switching 
behavior, no consistent relation was seen between EF and baseline behaviors. This is 
similar to previous findings in the literature regarding delay of gratification and other hot 
tasks. In light of the complex nature of these hot tasks and the multiple factors both 
internal and external that may contribute to the observed behavior, it is clear that these 
tasks are not a pure measure of control. Although EF processes may be recruited, their 
effect may be obscured by other influences on behavior, and relations between hot tasks 
and other self-control measures may not always be clearly observed or measured. 
Nature of Children’s Switching Behavior 
Interestingly, children were capable of adapting their behavior based on one-trial 
learning, as seen in the savings paradigm, where a single feedback experience was 
enough to cue children to adjust their behavior. The finding that switchers and non-
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switchers could be differentiated by the first trial in the delay choice modified paradigm 
suggests that, even without the opportunity for actual feedback and direct experience, 
children were able to use new information about contingencies in the environment to 
guide their behavior. Nonetheless, there was a role for learning. Differences in children’s 
choices between the first and second half of trials in the delay choice modified paradigm 
showed that by the end of the task, children were more likely to select the non-risky 
option than at the beginning of the task, presumably from repeated feedback across trials. 
This was pattern was even seen in non-switchers, although they did not fully shift their 
behavior. Children’s switching behavior is likely not a matter of simply switching or not 
switching, but can be understood in terms of how quickly and how much children switch, 
and how much information and feedback is needed to facilitate change in behavior.  
Interestingly, some children who did not show switching behavior seemed to 
understand which choice was more adaptive. In Study 1, approximately half of the 
children were unable to switch behaviorally, but stated a preference for the adaptive 
choice. In Study 2, over three quarters of the children who did not switch stated a 
preference that was inconsistent with their actions. Thus it appears that while some 
children were unable to behaviorally switch, they demonstrated some understanding 
about which choices or responses were more adaptive. This abulic dissociation between 
knowledge and using that knowledge is a common phenomenon seen in the DCCS 
(Zelazo & Frye, 1988). Children know the rules of the new game, but are unable to 
follow through in action. They may have trouble reflecting on the rules and integrating 
them in a high-order fashion to facilitate switching (Zelazo & Frye, 1988). Nisan and 
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Koriat (1977) reported similar findings, that over two thirds of children who did not delay 
answered that a “smart” child would chose to delay. In a more recent study (Prencipe & 
Zelazo, 2005), 3-year-olds tended to choose immediate rewards for themselves but later 
rewards for another person. Since these children can recognize the rational or adaptive 
choice, although they may not follow through behaviorally, they may be more mature 
than those who do not show adaptation of their behavior and cannot identify the adaptive 
choice. It is possible that these children may be able to benefit with a great number of 
trials and feedback, which is also supported by trends showing some behavior change 
across trials. 
Temperament and Compulsive Behaviors 
In hot tasks involving delaying or saving, children’s temperamental reactivity 
may impact how children respond to rewarding and punishing stimuli and events, 
depending on children’s approach tendencies and their predisposition to fear, withdrawal, 
and negative affect. Surprisingly, there was little association observed between these 
dimensions of temperament and children’s baseline delay and saving behavior, although 
delaying was positively related to negative affect in Study 2. Just as the complexity of 
standard hot tasks may obscure associations with EF control processes, it may also make 
it difficult to differentiate and identify associations with temperamental reactivity. That 
is, while these aspects of reactivity may have an effect on behavior, in the context of 
other potentially stronger influences, they may be more difficult to detect or less relevant. 
Despite the few findings related to baseline behaviors, the regulatory component 
of effortful control was related to switching, but also showed some relations to EF. It 
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suggests a close overlapping relationship between effortful control and EF, and in fact, 
some of the items related to effortful control on the CBQ include behaviors related to 
inhibitory control and attention, which are important processes of EF. However, they may 
also make independent contribution toward flexible behavior. In Study 2, effortful control 
was not correlated with EF, but was correlated with switching. Items related to perceptual 
sensitivity and noticing changes in the environment were part of the subscale measuring 
effortful control. It is possible that these behaviors may facilitate switching behavior by 
enhancing children’s perception of context changes, which is necessary before children 
can act on those changes. Greater negative affect was also related to less switching, 
which highlights the potentially important role of negative emotions. Negative emotions 
may emerge when children are pushed towards behavior that is less preferred, less 
rewarding, or perhaps contrary to their natural temperament. Likewise, negative emotions 
may also arise when children fail to adjust their behavior to changes in the environment 
or past events, and experience negative or frustrating consequences.  
In view of these various findings regarding children’s flexibility as measured by 
our experimental paradigms, it was of interest to examine whether children’s flexibility in 
the laboratory would be reflected in their everyday behaviors. During the preschool years, 
there is a developmental increase in the number of ritualistic and compulsive behaviors 
(Evans et al., 1997), and it was predicted that children who showed more flexibility 
would be less likely to engage in compulsive behaviors. Surprisingly, children’s 
compulsive behaviors was unrelated to switching in our paradigms, although they were 
related to other skills and capacities that were correlated positively with switching, such 
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as effortful control and EF. Whereas greater EF was related to less compulsive behaviors, 
greater effortful control was related to more compulsive behaviors, especially “just right” 
behaviors. The positive relationship with effortful control, as discussed above, may be 
related to perceptual sensitivity, and noticing minute changes in the environment, which 
is an aspect of “just right” behaviors.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The parallel results of the two studies are largely encouraging, but several 
limitations should be considered. First, although our interpretation is that children’s set-
shifting skills facilitated their ability to adapt their behavior in the delay and savings task, 
the EF Scale was administered only at the end of the session, and thus one can argue that 
the better performance of switchers was related to generalization effects. That is, 
switching during the delay and savings tasks led to switching on the EF Scale. Simple 
exposure to the opportunity to switch was likely not an influence, as indicated by the lack 
of spontaneous switching in the control group, although children who switched may have 
somehow increased their propensity to switch again during the EF Scale. It should be 
noted that children switched of their own accord without feedback from the experimenter 
and no explicit training or encouragement regarding switching was provided. To rule out 
the possibility with certainty, however, the order of tasks should be counterbalanced. It 
would also be informative if one could show that training or developmental 
improvements in EF leads to greater switching in the current paradigms.  
Relatedly, another complexity not explored in the current studies is that what is 
adaptive in a given environment may vary across individuals. Recent research has shown 
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that what is adaptive can be shaped by characteristics of one’s early childhood 
environment, such as harshness and unpredictability. These types of characteristics may 
be found in lower socioeconomic status (SES) environments. In a series of experiments 
by Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson, and Tybur (2011), when adults were primed with 
mortality cues through a false news article, individuals of lower childhood SES reported 
attitudes and plans for having children at an earlier age than non-primed controls. In 
contrast, individuals of higher childhood SES reported plans for having children later 
than controls. Although initially there appeared to be no difference between the groups, 
when primed with mortality cues, a context change, one group shifted towards a faster 
life strategy (i.e., having children earlier), while the other shifted towards a slower life 
strategy (i.e., having children later). This is argued to be adaptive respectively for each 
group within an evolutionary framework (see Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 
2009). The same phenomenon was replicated with risk preferences, delay discounting, 
and probabilistic discounting (Griskevicius et al., 2013; Griskevicius, Tybur, Delton, & 
Robertson, 2011), which all showed that when primed with mortality or resource scarcity, 
lower childhood SES individuals shifted towards risky behaviors and immediate rewards, 
whereas higher childhood SES individuals shifted in the opposite direction towards less 
risky behaviors and delaying. This illustrates that what is considered an adaptive response 
to a particular problem can differ across individuals. Further research is needed to better 
understand what are adaptive responses for different individuals and what are important 
variables where individuals begin to diverge, such as childhood SES. 
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Continued research is needed to answer questions regarding the domain 
specificity or domain general function of this flexibility in behavior. For example, 
flexibility in one type of behavior may or may not be related to flexibility in another type 
of behavior. In the current study, if the same children experienced both paradigms, would 
the switchers in the delay paradigm also be switchers in the saving paradigm? In light of 
the associations between flexibility, core EF processes, and effortful control, we might 
expect at least some correspondence between flexibility in various situations. Although 
delaying and saving behaviors retain some important differences, they are also quite 
similar, and it would be important to examine flexibility with other types of behaviors. 
Furthermore, the current paradigms have emphasized the adaptive goals of maximizing 
utility and pleasure, but other types of adaptive goals, such as those in the social, moral, 
and cultural domain may also motivate behavioral changes. Research examining the types 
of behaviors in which children can show flexibility, and the types of adaptive goals to 
which children are sensitive will help us gain a better understanding of when flexibility in 
behavior is important and the extent to which EF are recruited in these circumstances.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the current study findings show that at a basic level, children’s delay of 
gratification and saving behavior are sensitive to context and past experience, and 
furthermore, children’s ability to adjust their behavior according to what is presently 
adaptive is likely supported by EF. Importantly, these findings show that although some 
children may exhibit poor control by default, in the right context, the same children can 
be capable of demonstrating control, and in fact, may have more mature EF. When there 
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is no consistent goal or correct way to behave, it is not surprising that children can appear 
more controlled in one situation and less controlled in another.  
This highlights the methodological value of assessing behavior across multiple 
contexts, especially when tasks are sensitive to contextual factors, such as delay of 
gratification and other hot tasks. With multiple measurements, we can better understand 
how the behavior is affected by key factors, and gain a more accurate and broader 
assessment of a child’s abilities and developmental profile, as performance in a single 
context may not be representative of a child’s competence. The importance of evaluating 
behavior in multiple contexts has been noted in work with behaviorally inhibited children 
(Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000) and children with attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (Barkley, 1990), where symptomatic behavior is sometimes only elicited or 
detected in certain contexts. As children appear heterogeneous in their response to 
changing environmental demands, measurements of this variability itself may also impart 
valuable information.   
Delay of gratification and saving are clearly complex decision-making behaviors 
that integrate multiple influences including sociocultural factors, situational factors, and 
individual characteristics. As is distinctive of many hot tasks, delay of gratification and 
saving problems are not clearly defined. They involve ambiguity, uncertainty, emotion, 
and motivation. Because there are no clear rules to guide behavior, we must look to the 
context to identify the most optimal or adaptive course of action given past, present, and 
future concerns. What is considered adaptive can differ across individuals and groups of 
individuals, and there are many reasons one may choose to delay or not delay. Delaying 
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and saving is not always the most adaptive response, and accordingly, lack of such 
behavior should not be indicative of deficient control or willpower. It is important in our 
assessments of children’s behavior in such tasks to acknowledge the important distinction 
between competence and performance, and to interpret behaviors carefully in light of 
contextual and individual factors. 
 Because complex and “hot” real-world problems are dependent on the context, the 
ability to flexibly adjust one’s behavior to changing demands is a critical aspect of 
adaptive functioning. Adaptive goals can vary, from, maximizing rewards and pleasure to 
maintaining social relationships. In all cases, we must attend to both contextual 
information in the environment and internal goals, states, and motivations, and analyze 
the fit between the self and environment to respond in the most adaptive manner. EF 
processes likely play an important role in facilitating flexible behavior, especially when 
certain behaviors or decisions are difficult to enact because they conflict with one’s 
desires or natural tendencies, or perhaps elicits fear or anxieties. Development itself has 
been described as movement towards increasing flexibility, differentiation, and 
organization, allowing the individual to adapt to the environment with a greater range of 
means, behavioral patterns, and functions (Sroufe & Rutter, 1984). As children’s 
behavioral repertoire and EF skills develop over time, it confers an in increasing ability to 
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Note. Correlations are presented for the full sample (N = 140); however, correlations involving Switching are based on only the 
experimental group (n = 77) where the variable is relevant.  




Table 4  
 




3.5 years  4.5 years  Total  
Sex Sa Sp TOT Sa Sp TOT  Sa Sp 
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Table 5  
 




Savers  Spenders  Total  















































































































































           
 





           
 
 3. Delay Baseline  
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Note. Correlations are presented for the full sample (N = 142); however, correlations involving Switching are based on only the 
experimental group (n = 102) where the variable is relevant, and correlations involving Delay Baseline exclude children delaying 4 or 
5 trials (n = 105) to maintain consistency with Study 1.  

















Comparison of Main Findings Related to Baseline and Switching Behaviors in Study 1 and Study 2 
 
Note. F = Females, M = Males; Sa = Savers, Sp = Spenders; D = Delayers, ND = Non-delayers; S = Switchers, NS = Non-switchers. 
a Excluding children who delayed 4 or 5 trials.  










Switching – Delay 
(Study 1) 






4.5 > 3.5  
 
Yes** 
4.5 > 3.5  
No No Yes*** 





F > M 
Yes† 
F > M  
No No Yes† 




-- -- No 
 
Yes*c 











No No Yes*** 
Sa > Sp 
No Yes*c 
S > NS 
EF Scaleb  
 
 
No No No Yes* 
S > NS 
Yes* 
S > NS 
94 
 
c Not significant after Bonferroni correction for multiple tests 
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 


























Figure 1. Panels used to deliver immediate and delayed treats to child during modified 
delay choice task. Each panel was associated with either the now choice or the later 
choice, with one conferring a risk of losing treats (i.e., box), and one providing certainty 
of treats (i.e., two bowls). Assignment of panels was based on children’s baseline 
performance, with the risky panel assigned to children’s preferred response in the 



























Figure 2. Small marbles game and big marbles game used in saving task.  
 
 
